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DOES FREE EXERCISE MEAN FREE STATE FUNDING?
IN DA VEY V. LOCKE, THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNDERVALUED WASHINGTON'S VISION OF
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Derek D. Green
Abstract: In Davey v. Locke, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit ruled that Washington violated the Free Exercise Clause by refusing to allow a
scholarship recipient to use state funds to pursue a theology degree. The court held that the
state's scholarship requirements facially discriminated against religion, and that the state's
interest in not violating its constitution did not serve as a compelling reason for the
discrimination. In so holding, the Davey court ignored Ninth Circuit precedent and embraced
a theory of the Religion Clauses at odds with United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Furthermore, as explained in the dissent, the scholarship requirements are analogous to
permissible limitations placed on other government funding programs. Based on U.S.
Supreme Court precedent in other conditional funding cases, Davey should be overturned.

Washington's Promise Scholarship program provides state funding to
qualified students who plan to attend college within the state.' As with
other financial aid programs, the state placed conditions on the eligibility
and use of the Promise Scholarship to ensure that the public's money is
spent as the state intended.2 These conditions include graduating from a
Washington high school, achieving a certain high school class rank, and
demonstrating financial need. 3 The Promise Scholarship also requires
that recipients not pursue a theology degree with the state funds.4 This
last requirement is necessary to comply with state law5 as well as the
Washington State Supreme Court's interpretation of the state
constitution.6 Since its founding, Washington's constitution has provided
that "[n]o public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied
to any religious worship, exercise or instruction."7

1.See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-010 (2001).
2. See 1999 Wash. Laws 309 § 611(6); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020.
3. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020.
4. Id. § 250-80-020(12)(f).
5. WASH REV. CODE § 28B.10.814 (2002) ("No aid shall be awarded to any student who is
pursuing a degree in theology.").
6. See Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 771 P.2d 1119 (1989)
[hereinafter Witters It].
7. WASH. CONST. art I, § Il (as amended 1993). The amendment did not alter this language.
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Joshua Davey received a Promise Scholarship in 1999.8 He enrolled at
Northwest College, an accredited private school in Washington State. 9
Under the terms of the Promise Scholarship, Davey was allowed to use
the state funds at a religiously affiliated college such as Northwest,
which emphasized teaching from a "distinctly Christian" perspective."
However, because state law prohibited funding a theology degree, Davey
lost his Promise Scholarship when he decided to pursue Northwest's
"Pastoral Ministries" major, a program designed to train students to
become ministers." Davey challenged the state's policy, 2 arguing among
other claims 3 that the refusal to fund his theology degree violated his
First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion."
Davey's challenge raised an unresolved issue involving the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses, which provide that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof."' 5 In Davey v. Locke,' 6 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit had to consider whether an area exists between the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses in which a state is free to define
its own vision of religious liberty.' 7 Based upon the court's holding, if
such an area exists, then it does not encompass a state's refusal to fund
religious degrees.' 8 The Ninth Circuit held that the state's Promise
Scholarship requirement facially discriminated against a class of students
on the basis of religion.' 9 Because the state did not have a compelling
reason for the selective treatment, the court ruled that the program
violated the student's right to the free exercise of religion.20
8. See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 2002).
9. See id.
10. See id.
I1.See id.
12. Id.
13. Davey also argued that the program violated the Establishment Clause, as well as his rights to
free speech, association, and equal protection under the federal and state constitutions. See id. at 750;
Appellant's Brief at 11-15, Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-35962). This
Note focuses on the Free Exercise Clause challenge, which was the basis of the court's decision in
Davey. See 299 F.3d at 750.
14. Davey, 299 F.3d at 750.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Religion Clauses are made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
16. 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002).
17. See id.
at 760-61 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
18. See id. at 750.
19. Id.
20. Id.

Requiring States to Fund Religious Training

According to Judge McKeown's dissent, however, the majority
misconstrued the issue. 2' The state's program did not prohibit the
exercise of anything; rather, it simply reflected a decision by the state to
fund certain activities and not others.22 Relying on U.S. Supreme Court
precedent involving state funding and fundamental rights, the dissent
maintained that the Promise Scholarship's requirements were
permissible.23
This Note agrees with the dissent and argues that Washington's
Promise Scholarship complies with the Free Exercise Clause. In holding
otherwise, the Davey court failed to adequately address conflicting
precedent in the Ninth Circuit, as well as other courts, and contradicted
Supreme Court precedent in conditional funding cases. Part I provides an
overview of the Supreme Court's historical treatment of the Religion
Clauses in educational funding. Part II discusses the Court's general
framework for deciding Free Exercise Clause challenges. Part III
examines the Court's analytic approach to cases involving the
conditional funding of other fundamental rights. Part IV provides a
summary of the Davey case and an explanation of the Ninth Circuit's
evaluation of the case. Finally, Part V argues why the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Davey was incorrect, and Part VI concludes that Washington's
scholarship program does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. In
practice, the Promise Scholarship does not suppress religion; it simply
reflects a rational choice by the state to fund activities that conform with
its constitution.

I.

A HISTORY OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES IN
EDUCATIONAL FUNDING CASES

The U.S. Supreme Court has not directly addressed the extent to
which a state, consistent with both of the First Amendment's Religion
Clauses, can exclude private religious schools and students from
educational funding programs available to others.24 However, the Court
has decided a number of cases involving the Religion Clauses and

21. See id. at 761 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
22. Id. (McKeown, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 761, 764-66 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
24. Cf Columbia Union Coll. v. Clark, 527 U.S. 1013, 1014-15 (1999) (mem.) (denying cert.)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the "growing confusion among the lower courts" surrounding the
permissibility of denying state funding to religious schools).
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educational funding. 25 This part summarizes the principles from these
cases. The first section frames the current debate by discussing the
Court's decision nearly twenty years ago in a case very similar to the one
at issue in Davey. The second section provides an overview of the
Court's past decisions involving the Religion Clauses and educational
funding.
A.

Setting the Stage: Witters v. Washington Department of Services
for the Blind

Joshua Davey was not the first to raise the issue of educational
funding and the Religion Clauses in the state of Washington.2 6 In Witters
v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,27 the U.S. Supreme
Court reviewed the state of Washington's refusal to allow Larry Witters
28
to use vocational assistance monies to fund his religious training.
Witters argued that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit the state
from funding this training, and that the Free Exercise Clause required it.29
Although the U.S. Supreme Court declined to address Witters' Free
Exercise Clause challenge, it agreed with Witters' Establishment Clause
argument. 30 Foreshadowing the reasoning of future Establishment Clause
cases, 3' the Court concluded that the government's role was sufficiently
independent from religion because it provided money to individuals
instead of directly to religious organizations.32 As a result, the
Establishment Clause did not prohibit the state from paying for Witters'
training.33
However, the Court noted that a state could come to a different
conclusion based on its own constitution.3 4 On remand, the Washington
State Supreme Court did just that and held that the Washington
25. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 868-99 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(summarizing Establishment Clause challenges to educational funding programs).

26. See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) [hereinafter
Witters II], rev'g sub nom. Witters v. Comm'n for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 689 P.2d 53 (1984)

[hereinafter Witters I].
27. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
28. See id. at 483-84.

29. See id. at 489-90.
30. Id.
31. See infra Part l.B.

32. See Witters I, 474 U.S. at 488-89.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 489.

Requiring States to Fund Religious Training
Constitution prohibited the "use of public moneys to pay for such
religious instruction."35 The state high court noted a "major difference"
between the Washington and federal prohibitions on public funding of
religion: the federal Establishment Clause prohibited "the appropriation
of public money for religious instruction," while the Washington
Constitution also prohibited "the application of [state] funds to religious
instruction. 36 Because Witters would apply the state funding towards
religious education, the state was justified in denying him financial
assistance.37
The Washington State Supreme Court concluded that its reading of the
state constitution did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.3 8 To the court,
the major issue was whether a government action coerced the individual
into violating a religious belief 39 The court held that it did not.40 In the
court's words, the recipient "chose to become a minister, and the
Commission's only action was to refuse to pay for his theological
education. The Commission's decision may make it financially difficult,
or even impossible, for [the applicant] to become a minister, but this is
beyond the scope of the free exercise clause., 41 The U.S. Supreme Court
declined to review the state court decision, 42 and has not directly
addressed the Free Exercise Clause issue left open in Witters 1J.43
However, the Court's multiple rulings on educational funding programs
in other contexts do provide some guidance on the question.
B.

U.S. Supreme CourtJurisprudenceon the Funding of Religious
Education

The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions involving state funding of
religious education reflect the Court's "struggl[e], 44 to navigate between

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Witters 111,112 Wash. 2d 363, 369, 771 P.2d 1119, 1121 (1989).
Id. at 370, 771 P.2d at 1122 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 365, 771 P.2d at 1119-20.
Id. at 371, 771 P.2d at 1123.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Witters 1, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 631, 689 P.2d 53, 57 (1984)).
Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 493 U.S. 850 (1989) (mem.) (denying cert).

43. See supra note 24.

44. Cf Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
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the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.4 5 Both clauses are written
in "absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme,
would tend to clash with the other. '46 Yet despite their "internal
47 the Religion Clauses work together to ensure
tensions,
religious
48
liberty.
Numerous cases involving state funding of religious education have
focused on the Establishment Clause. 49 In determining whether a funding
program violates the Establishment Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court has
considered factors that include whether a program fosters neutrality
through private choice, distributes funds equally to students attending
religious and non-religious schools, and uses state funds for a
permissible purpose. 0 The Court's review of educational funding on
Free Exercise Clause grounds is more limited. Although its opinions do
not provide clear precedent, the Court has affirmed one ruling that the
Free Exercise Clause does not require state action simply because it is
permitted under the Establishment Clause.5
1.

The Establishment Clause in EducationalFunding Cases

The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause as
reflecting a belief that "a union of government and religion tends to
destroy government and degrade religion."52 The Court's jurisprudence
involving religion and educational funding has historically reflected this
view.53 For example, in the first of the modem school funding cases,
Everson v. Board of Education,54 the Court approved the use of funds to
subsidize the transportation of students, including those attending
45. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 844 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (commenting on
the "difficult questions" confronted at the intersection of the Establishment Clause and other First
Amendment rights).
46. Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69.
47. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971).
48. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 256 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
49. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 868-99 (2000) (Souter, J.,dissenting)
(summarizing cases).
50. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, § 12.2, at
1190-94 (2d ed. 2002).
51. Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 419 U.S. 888 (1974) (mer.).
52. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431 (1962).
53. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589-90 (1992) ("It must not be forgotten then, that
[the Religion Clauses also] exist to protect religion from government interference."); Engel, 370
U.S. at 431; Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 18 (1947).
54. 330 U.S. I (1947).
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parochial schools, to and from school.55 However, the Court commented
that there were limits to this kind of interaction, stating that the "First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must
be kept high and impregnable. 5 6 More recently, the Court has gradually
allowed more interaction between state funds and private religious
education,57 although it has not explicitly refuted Everson's warning.5
The Court's recent Establishment Clause decisions have increasingly
focused on whether a program fosters government "neutrality" through
"private choice."59 Disbursing public funds directly to students instead of
religious institutions conveys neutrality because it leaves the decision
whether to apply funds towards a religious education to "private choice"
and not government action.6" For example, in Zelman v. SimmonsHarris,6' the Court ruled that Cleveland's school voucher program was
permissible because it promoted private choice by giving money
directly
62
to students for use at either religious or non-religious schools.
In addition, the Court has considered other factors as well in
determining a program's permissibility.63 The Court has upheld aid
programs that are available to students of both public and private
schools' or that fund solely non-religious uses 65 under the Establishment

55. Id. at 17.
56. Id. at 18.
57. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50. The Court devised a three-part test for Establishment
Clause cases in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Under Lemon, the Court considers if a
program (I) has an actual secular purpose, (2) has a principal effect of advancing or restricting
religion, and (3) creates excessive government entanglement with religion. See id. at 612-13. The
Lemon factors helped to shape the Court's opinions in school aid cases, but the Court's reliance on
the Lemon test has wavered in recent years. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-09
(2000) (plurality opinion) (stating that under Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), the Court
relies upon only the first two Lemon factors in school aid cases).
58. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 687 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 648-54; Helms, 530 U.S. at 809-10 (2000) (plurality opinion). See generally
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50.

60. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 622.
61. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
62. Id. at 662-63.
63. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 839-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the Court has "never
held that a govemment-aid program passes constitutional muster solely because of the neutral
criteria it employs as a basis for distributing aid") (emphasis in original).
64. Compare Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973)
(striking down a tuition-grant program that favored private over public school students), with
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397 (1983) (approving of an aid program benefiting public and
private school students).
65. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 674-75 (1971).
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Clause.66 For example, the Court rejected a funding program that favored
students attending non-public schools over students attending public
schools as an impermissible establishment of religion, 67 but ten years
later upheld a program that distributed funding evenly to students
68
attending public and private schools.
The Court has also approved of programs with "no aid" to religion
provisions, which restrict the use of public funds to solely secular
purposes. 69 For example, in Tilton v. Richardson,70 the Court reviewed a
federal program that subsidized the cost of constructing new facilities at
colleges and universities. 7 The program permitted religious institutions
to participate, but "expressly prohibit[ed] use of the facilities for
religious purposes. 7' The plurality decision upheld the funding program
based on the program's explicit secular use requirement, 73 but struck
down a provision that allowed organizations to convert the facilities to
religious use after twenty years, reasoning that it would violate the
Establishment Clause.74
However, the importance placed on these "no-aid" provisions varies in
the Court's opinions. 75 The plurality and concurring opinions in Mitchell
66. See generally CHEMERINSKY, sutpra note 50. Although more recent decisions have not
emphasized these factors as much, lower courts are still required to consider them when applicable.
See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) ("[I]f a precedent of this Court has direct
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decision, the Court
of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
67. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38, 794.
68. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397.
69. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); accordAgostini, 521 U.S. at 211-12, 235
(allowing public school teachers to teach secular subjects at religious schools); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at
838 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
70. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
71. See id. at 674-77.
72. Id. at 677.
73. See id. at 679-81.
74. Id.at 682-84. All Justices reviewing the case agreed that this provision violated the
Establishment Clause. See id at 692 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 660-61 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part with Lemon and concurring in part and
dissenting in part with Tilton) (concluding that providing grants to "sectarian institutions" violates
the Establishment Clause); id.at 665 n. I (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part with
Lemon and concurring in judgment with Tilton) (agreeing that allowing government-subsidized
buildings to be used for religious purposes after twenty years is impermissible).
75. Compare Tilton,
403 U.S. at 682-84 (rejecting a statutory provision allowing buildings
constructed with public funds to be used for religious purposes after a set amount of time), with
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1,3 (1993) (allowing sign language interpreters at
religious schools).
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v. Helms 6 reflect this divide. In Mitchell, the Court upheld a program
providing funds for schools to purchase equipment and supplies.77 The
program required the use of "neutral, secular criteria"78 for all purchases.
The plurality opinion noted that the program satisfied precedent by not
providing "religious schools [with] aid that has an impermissible
content,"79 but stated that diversion of funds towards religious
indoctrination was otherwise permissible.80 In contrast, Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in judgment only, and
stated that she "disagree[d] with the plurality's conclusion that actual
diversion of government aid to religious indoctrination is consistent with
the Establishment Clause."'" Instead, Justice O'Connor emphasized the
program's secular requirements, including the prohibition on making
payments for religious worship or instruction.82
As the above cases reflect, the emphasis placed on "private choice,"
availability of funds for both private and public school students, and "no
aid" provisions varies in the Court's Establishment Clause cases.
Although recent school aid cases have focused on private choice, the
Court has warned against concluding that its reasoning has "by
implication" overruled earlier precedent.83 Absent clear direction to the
contrary, lower courts should continue to consider all relevant factors.84
2.

The U.S. Supreme Court's Limited Review of the Free Exercise
Clause in EducationalFunding Cases

The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the claim that excluding
religious school students from receiving educational benefits violates the
Free Exercise Clause.85 However, the Court did so in a memorandum

76. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
77. Id. at 801.
concurring).
78. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 848 (O'Connor, J.,
79. Id. at 831.
80. Id. at 820.
concurring). Justice O'Connor also stated that these programs, even
81. Id. at 840 (O'Connor, J.,
if they require "secular" use, conform with the Court's definition of "neutrality." See id. at 838.
82. Id. 848-49.
83. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) ("We do not acknowledge, and we do not
hold, that other courts should conclude our more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an
earlier precedent.").
84. See id.
85. Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 419 U.S. 888 (1974) (mem.), affg 364 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Mo.
1973).
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opinion without comment.86 In Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann,8 7 the Court
affirmed a three-judge district court decision holding that providing
busing services only to students attending public schools was permissible
under the Free Exercise Clause.88 A federal district court for the Western
District of Missouri ruled that the Free Exercise Clause did not require
transporting students to parochial schools simply because the
Establishment Clause permitted it. 89 Instead, the district court concluded
that the state's policy fell within an area "between the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause in which action by a State will not
violate the former nor inaction, the latter."90
The Luetkemeyer district court also held that the state's "long
established constitutional policy" of requiring a strict separation of
church and state served as a "compelling state interest" justifying "any
possible infringement of the Free Exercise [C]lause." 9' Seven years later,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that First Amendment rights can
limit a state's ability to ensure a greater separation of church and state
than provided under the Establishment Clause.92 In Widmar v. Vincent,93
the Court held that a state university could not exclude student religious
groups from using public facilities open to other organizations. 9 4 The
Court limited its holding to free speech and association grounds,95
however, and refused to consider whether "a state interest, derived from
its own constitution, could ever outweigh free speech interests protected
by the First Amendment."9 6 The Widmar Court also did not address the

86. Id.
87. 419 U.S. 888 (1974) (mem.).
88. Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F. Supp. 376, 377 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (three-judge panel), aff'd,
419 U.S. 888 (1974) (mem.).
89. See Luetkemeyer, 364 F. Supp. at 386. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1,17 (1947) that providing transportation to school for both parochial and nonparochial school students would not violate the Establishment Clause. See also supra notes 54-56
and accompanying text (discussing Everson).
90. Luetkeineyer, 364 F. Supp. at 386.
91. Id.
92. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (noting that the state's interest in achieving a
greater separation of church and state "is limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the
Free Speech Clause as well").
93. Id.
94. Id. at 265-66.
95. Id. at 273 n.13. Although the Court did not base its ruling on Free Exercise Clause grounds,
the Court did comment that the Free Exercise Clause can limit a state's ability to require a greater
separation of church and state than provided under the First Amendment. See id. at 276.
96. Id. at 275-76.
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district court's conclusion in Luetkemeyer that a permissible area exists
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause in which
the states are free to legislate.97
In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the
permissibility of excluding religious schools and students from
educational funding under the Free Exercise Clause. However, as the
Establishment Clause's "no aid" cases reflect, the Court has used the fact
that state programs exclude religious schools and students from
educational funding as a justification for upholding programs against
Establishment Clause challenges. These cases indicate the Court's
understanding of the narrow role the government should play in religious
education, and serve as a reminder of the limitations placed on the Free
Exercise Clause by the Establishment Clause.
II.

THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE REVIEW

Outside of the educational funding context, the U.S. Supreme Court
has decided a number of Free Exercise Clause cases. 98 These cases have
established some clear principles. First, the Free Exercise Clause
provides absolute protection for religious beliefs, and offers some
protection for religious practices.99 Second, laws lacking "neutrality" and
"general applicability" toward religion are subject to closer review than
those that do not. 0 0
Other principles of Free Exercise Clause review, however, are less
clear. Lower courts are split on the proper standard of review required
when a state program or law lacks facial neutrality but does not have as
its purpose the suppression of religion.'0 ' Further, the U.S. Supreme
Court has distinguished between programs that directly prohibit the

97. Cf Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1972) (plurality opinion) (discussing the Court's
historic attempts to find the "neutral area" between the Religion Clauses "within which the

legislature may legitimately act").
98. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-80 (1990) (summarizing cases). The
principles of the Free Exercise Clause apply to both federal and state actions. See Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (referencing Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)).

99. See, e.g., Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533; see generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, § 12.3.1.
100. See id at 546.
101. Compare KDM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 1999) (refusing to
apply strict scrutiny to a non-neutral program that did not reflect hostility as applied), with Peter v.
Wed], 155 F.3d 992, 996-97 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying strict scrutiny to similar program).
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exercise of religion and those that condition funding on restricting a
practice of religion." 2
A.

EstablishedPrinciplesof Free Exercise Clause Review

The U.S. Supreme Court's Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence has
established two clear principles. The first is that a government cannot
directly regulate "religious beliefs as such."'0 3 For example, the state
cannot require government officials to declare their belief in God,
regardless of the state's reasons for the requirement.0 4 As a result, most
Free Exercise Clause cases do not involve direct attempts to regulate
religious beliefs, but rather government actions affecting the practice of
religion.'0 5 Although the Free Exercise Clause does not provide absolute
06
protection for religious conduct, it does offer some protection.
McDaniel v. Paty0 7 provides an example. In McDaniel, a plurality held
that prohibiting ministers from holding public office did not amount to a
regulation based on religious beliefs, but still constituted an
impermissible regulation of religious conduct.'0 8
The second principle of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence is
distinguishing between laws that are "neutral"' 0 9 and "of general
applicability" ' ' and those that are not.' A government action that is
neutral and generally applicable does not require strict scrutiny review.'"
For instance, the respondents in Employment Division v. Smith" 3 lost
their jobs after using peyote in a religious ceremony." 4 The state refused
102. Cf Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-85.
103. Id.at 877 (1990) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)) (emphasis in
original); accord McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (plurality opinion) (stating that
restricting beliefs is "categorically prohibit[ed]" by the First Amendment).
104. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626 (plurality opinion) (citing Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488

(1961)).
105. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-80 (summarizing cases).
106. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
107. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).

108. Id. at 626-27.
109. See Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 531.
10. See id.
111. Compare Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 546 (requiring strict scrutiny for a law lacking neutrality),
with Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (effectively requiring only rational basis review for a neutral, generally
applicable law).
112. See Hialeah, 508 U.S. at531.
113. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
114. Id. at 874-75.
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to grant unemployment benefits to the respondents because they had
violated a criminal law against the abuse of controlled substances." 5
Although the Court acknowledged the effect of the law on the
respondents' exercise of religion, it stated that the Oregon law was
generally applicable and neutral towards religion." 6 Accordingly, the
Court refused to require a "compelling interest" for the law, and instead
relied upon the highly deferential rational basis standard." 7 Because the
state had a legitimate interest in regulating peyote, the law's
infringement upon the exercise of religious beliefs was inconsequential
under rational basis review." 8
In contrast to neutral government actions, courts review laws lacking
neutrality or general applicability towards religion more closely.' If the
object of the law is to suppress religion, it must be justified by a
compelling state interest. 2t ' In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah,2 ' the Court held that a city's attempt to prohibit the use of
22
animal sacrifices in sacred rituals violated the Free Exercise Clause.
The Court identified the lack of neutrality and general applicability of the
law as indications of impermissible government hostility towards
religion. 23 As such, the Court applied strict scrutiny review and held
that
24
the city did not have a compelling reason for such discrimination.
B.

CircuitSplit on Laws Lacking an Object of SuppressingReligion

Two divergent theories have emerged in the federal circuit courts
about the proper level of review required when a law lacks facial
neutrality towards religion but does not have the object of suppressing
religion. 25 The first theory holds that the Hialeah decision requires any
115. Id.
116. Seeid. at878.

117. The Court did not explicitly state that it was using the "rational basis" standard, but
commentators have interpreted it as such. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, § 12.3.
118. See Smith, 494 U.S at 890.

119. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993).
120. See id. at 533-34, 546. Although the focus in Davey is on neutrality rather than general
applicability, "[n]eutrality and general applicability are interrelated ... failure to satisfy one
requirement is a likely indication the other has not been satisfied." Id. at 531.
121. 508 U.S. 520(1993).

122. Id. at 524.
123. See id. at 542.
124. Id. at 546-47.

125. Compare KDM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 1999), with Peter
v. Wedl, 155 F.3d 992, 996-98 (8th Cir. 1998).
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law that is not facially neutral to be justified by a compelling state
interest.'26 In contrast, under the second theory the Hialeah decision's
strict scrutiny analysis only applies if a court determines that the object
of the law is to suppress religion. 27 Lacking this purpose, heightened
scrutiny is required only if the law places a "substantial burden" on the
exercise of religion.' 28
Under the first approach, a law that is not facially neutral towards
30
religion is automatically subject to strict scrutiny. 29 In Peter v. Wedl,
the Eighth Circuit reviewed a Minnesota school district's refusal to
provide a paraprofessional assistant to an otherwise eligible disabled
student because he attended a private religious school. 13 1 Underlying the
school district's decision was a state law that prohibited public funding
of religious education. 32 The Wedl court determined that the state law
"explicitly discriminated against children who attended private religious
schools," 33 and was not justified by a compelling state interest.
Concluding that the state law lacked facial neutrality, the court implicitly
assumed it was motivated by animus towards religion."'
In contrast, other federal circuit courts have looked beyond the face of
a government action to determine if it reflected a purpose to suppress
religion. 136 The Ninth Circuit adopted this approach in 1999, three years
prior to Davey. In KDM v. Reedsport School District,137 the Ninth Circuit
ruled that an Oregon school district's application of a state regulation
prohibiting religious schools from receiving government-funded special
education services did not violate the free exercise of religion.'3 8 The
126. See, e.g., Wedl, 155 F.3d at 996-98.
127. See Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 65 (1st Cir. 1999).
128. Id. (citing Hernandez v. Comm'r 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)).
129. See Wedl, 155 F.3d at 996-98; Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 978-79 (6th Cir. 1995).
130. 155 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998).
131. Id. at 994.
132. See id. at 996-97.
133. Id. at 996.
134. Id. at 996-97 (rejecting the contention that by attempting to comply with the Establishment
Clause, the law served a compelling interest). The Court also held that the law violated the student's
rights to equal protection and free speech. Id. at 997.
135. See id. at 998; cf id. at 1001-02 (refusing to consider whether the school district's decision
to deny assistance would be permissible if it were based on a reason other than a state law
"motivated by religious animus").
136. KDM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist, 196 F.3d 1046, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 1999) (reviewing statute as
applied); Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 65 (1st Cir. 1999).
137. 196 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 1999).
138. Id. at 1051.
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court acknowledged that the regulation was not facially neutral.'39 As
applied, the rule required those students attending religious schools to
travel to religiously neutral settings in order to receive the same
government benefits provided to public school students on-site. 40 Yet the
court concluded that, as applied through this program, the regulation did
not "reflect a purpose to 'suppress[] religion or religious conduct."""'
Thus, the Ninth Circuit did not apply Hialeah'sstrict scrutiny analysis.'42
The court further ruled that the regulation in practice did not impose an
"impermissible burden" on the exercise of religion.'43 By not subjecting
the law to heightened scrutiny, the court in effect only required a rational
basis for the law.
The court's opinion in KDM agreed with a decision by the First
Circuit in a case quite similar to Davey.144 In Strout v. Albanese, 145 the
First Circuit addressed the issue of whether Maine's practice of
providing funding to private secular schools-but not to religious
schools-violated the Free Exercise Clause. 46 The First Circuit held that
the practice did not violate the Free Exercise Clause 147 in part because,
unlike the ordinances in Hialeah, Maine's
program did not reflect "a
148
substantal animus" toward religion.
Consequently, the First Circuit in Strout relied on a test from
Hernandez v. Commissioner,14 in which the Supreme Court ruled that
heightened scrutiny was only required if a law imposed a "substantial
burden" on a "central religious belief or practice."' 5 0 Under the
139. Id. at 1050.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1050-51.
142. Id. Although the court left open whether the regulation could violate the Free Exercise
Clause as applied to another situation, the framework for determining if a law has an impermissible
purpose would remain the same. Cf id. at 1054 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("The majority says
Lukumi does not apply here because Oregon's regulation does not have as its object suppression of
religion or religious conduct.").
143. Id. at 1050-51.
144. Id. at 1051 (citing Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999)).
145. 178 F.3d 57 (lst Cir. 1999).
146. See id. at 59. See also Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999) (holding
that Maine's tuition-funding program did not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
147. Strout, 178 F.3d at 65 (listing four reasons for rejecting the Free Exercise challenge,
including the lack of animus towards religion).
148. Id.
149. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
150. Id. at 697-700. Although the Court warned against judging the "centrality of particular
beliefs or practices," it stated that it was the Court's duty to determine how substantial the burden is
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Hernandez ruling, a law is permissible if it supports a "broad public
interest."'' Applying the test from Hernandez, the Strout court held that
Maine's program was constitutional because the plaintiff could not
demonstrate how a state's refusal to fund attendance at a religious school
resulted in a substantial burden on a central belief.5 2 In addition, the First
Circuit reasoned that the government's action did not prohibit the
exercise of religion because it did not prevent the plaintiffs from
attending religious schools-rather, "[a]ll it means is that the cost of
1 53
religious education must be borne by the parents and not the state.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not resolved this split in the federal
circuit courts. Prior to Davey, both the Ninth and First Circuits first
determined if a law had the object of suppressing religion before
applying strict scrutiny analysis. 54 In other circuits, any law lacking
facial neutrality has required strict scrutiny review, regardless of
intent.55 At least one Justice has recognized this conflict, and urged the
Court to settle the issue.56
C.

DirectProhibitionversus ConditionalFunding

A second issue which remains unclear in Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence is whether direct prohibitions on religious conduct and
conditional funding of religious conduct should be subject to the same
standards. 57 Direct prohibitions, such as the ordinances prohibiting
ritualistic sacrifices of animals at issue in Hialeah,'5 8 are different than
programs that place conditions on the receipt of federal aid, such as
requiring individuals receiving unemployment benefits to be available
for work on particular days of the week.' 59 Both can result in a Free

on the religious practice. Id. at 699. But see Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 n.4
(1990) (rejecting this approach as contradictory).
151. Hernandez,490 U.S. at 699-700 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982)).
152. Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 65 (1st Cir. 1999).
153. Id. The First Circuit also determined that, alternatively, the state's interest in avoiding an

Establishment Clause violation justified any potential free exercise violation. Id.
154. See id. at 65; KDM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 1999).
155. See Peter v. Wedl, 155 F.3d 992, 996-97 (8th Cir. 1998).
156. See Columbia Union Coll. v. Clark, 527 U.S. 1013, 1015 (1999) (mem.) (denying cert.)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (commenting that Wedl and Strout illustrate that lower courts are

"struggling to reconcile our conflicting First Amendment pronouncements").
157. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-85 (1990).
158. 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993).
159. Sherbert v. Vemner, 374 U.S. 398, 399-401 (1963).
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Exercise Clause violation. 6 However, as the U.S. Supreme Court stated
in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Protective Cemetery Association,16 "the
Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot
do to the individual,
not in terms of what the individual can exact from
' 62
the government."'

A funding restriction can qualify as a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause. 63 In fact, in Sherbert v. Verner,'"6 the Court held that a state
unemployment law that only provided benefits to those willing to work
on Saturdays violated the Free Exercise Clause. 165 The Court focused on
the fact that the state law required some individuals to forego a central
tenet of their religion in order to qualify for the state funding.' 66 Yet in
67
more recent cases, the Court has limited the applicability of Sherbert.1
In Smith, for example, the Court rejected the use of the Sherbert test for
challenges to generally applicable criminal laws, 16 and noted its
reluctance to expand Sherbert outside the unemployment benefits
69
context. 1

Consequently, the two issues most relevant to the Davey case are
unsettled. First, does a law lacking facial neutrality and general
applicability automatically require strict scrutiny review, even if it does
not have a purpose to suppress religion? As noted above, the Circuit
Courts are split on this issue. 70 Second, should Free Exercise Clause
precedent that involves government prohibitions on religion apply to
Free Exercise Clause challenges based on government funding
decisions? With these uncertainties, courts must seek guidance from
other fundamental rights decisions.' 7 '
160. Compare id. at 403, with Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 524.

161. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
162. Id. at 451 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410 (Douglas, J.,concurring), in upholding logging

public land that is sacred to some Native Americans).
163. See, e.g., id. at 450.
164. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
165. See id. at 410.

166. See id.
at406.
167. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
168. Id.

169. Id. at 883 ("We have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert
test except the denial of unemployment compensation ....In recent years we have abstained from

applying the Sherbert test [outside the unemployment compensation field] at all.").
170. See supra Part II.B.
171. Cf Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 761 (McKeown, J.,dissenting) (concluding that the

Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence did not provide "sufficient guidance" for the Davey
case).
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LOOKING BEYOND THE RELIGION CLAUSES: FUNDING
VERSUS PROHIBITING THE EXERCISE OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS

The distinction between a direct prohibition of conduct and the
conditional funding of conduct exists in cases involving other
fundamental rights as well. 72 Supreme Court precedent indicates that the
state has broad discretion to place restrictions on the use of its own
funds. 73 Because "[c]onstitutional concerns are greatest when the State
attempts to impose its will by force of law," proving that a funding
program infringes upon a fundamental right is difficult. 74 There are
limits, however, on a state's ability to selectively fund activities. Most
notably, the purpose of a state's action cannot be to "suppress dangerous
ideas" by coercing individuals into refraining from expressing a
disfavored viewpoint."5

Although the "government may not deny a benefit to a person because
he exercises a constitutional right,"'' 76 it may refuse to fund the exercise
of that right. 177 Harris v. McRae

78

is a case on point. In Harris, a statute

prohibited the use of Medicaid funding to pay for certain "medically
necessary abortions" while allowing funding of other necessary
procedures. 79 The Court acknowledged that an individual has a
constitutionally protected right to terminate a pregnancy, 8 ' but still
upheld the program against both First Amendment and Equal Protection
challenges.' 8' The Court stated that although the liberty interest protected

172. "Fundamental rights and liberty interests" include both those guaranteed in the Constitution
and Bill of Rights, and those found within the "liberty" guarantee of the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997)
(consolidating cases).
173. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 477 (1977).
174. Id. at 476.
175. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983) (quoting
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)).
176. Id. at 545; accord Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958) (holding a state cannot deny
a general tax benefit to those that speak out against the government).
177. See, e.g., Regan, 461 U.S. at 545-56 (upholding preferential tax treatment conditioned on
restricting lobbying efforts); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (prohibiting Medicaid to
pay for abortions); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, § 11.2.4.4.
178. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
179. See id. at 301-02.
180. See id. at 312.
181. See id. at 321. The Court applied rational basis review to the Equal Protection claim. Id. at
324.
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"against unwarranted government interference," it did not "confer an
entitlement" to the funds needed to "realize all the advantages" of that
right. ' 2
The Court has upheld programs that restrict state funding for abortionrelated services on other occasions as well.' 83 For example, in Rust v.
Sullivan,'84 the Court upheld a law that prohibited medical providers
receiving government funding from even discussing abortion with their
patients.' 85 The Court's rationale was unambiguous: "[a] legislature's
decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not
infringe the right."' 86
The Court has applied this distinction between selectively subsidizing
a constitutionally protected right and prohibiting its exercise outside of
the abortion context. For example, in Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Washington,'87 the Court denied both free speech and
equal protection challenges to a program that granted tax-exempt status
to certain veteran's organizations engaged in lobbying while refusing the
status to other lobbying organizations.' 88 The Court permitted this
selective funding based upon group status, and dismissed "the notion that
First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are
subsidized by the State." ' 89
The Regan Court, however, did note one limit placed upon the
government's conditional subsidizing of speech: the law cannot be
"aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."' 9 ° This limit prevents a
state from using subsidies to coerce individuals into refraining from
expressing a disfavored viewpoint.' 9' The Court relied on this reasoning
in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia. 92 In

at 317-18.
182. Id.
183. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-93 (1991); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977).
184. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
185. See id. at 192-93.
186. Id. at 193 (internal citations omitted).
187. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
188. Id. at545-56.
omitted) (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498,
citations
189. Id. at 546 (internal
515 (1959) (Douglas J., concurring)).
190. Id. at 550 (quoting Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513). But cf Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v.
concurring) ("It is preposterous to equate the denial of taxpayer
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 596 (Scalia, J.,
subsidy with measures aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.") (quotations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
191. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587.
192. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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Rosenberger, the Court held that a state university's refusal to provide
funds to publish religiously-oriented student newsletters, while funding
the publication of non-religious student newsletters, violated the right to
free speech. 93 The Court explained that the program created a "public
forum" for speech, but then placed a restriction on the exercise of speech
within that forum solely based on viewpoint.'94 Acknowledging that the
Court had upheld other programs that declined to fund certain speech, the
Court distinguished the University's program by referencing the
"suppression of dangerous ideas" exception.'95 Although "preferential
treatment of certain speakers" based on group status is permissible under
Regan, placing restrictions on the "content or messages" of the speech is
1
not. 96
However, the Court has not consistently addressed what qualifies as
the suppression of disfavored viewpoints in conditional funding cases.
The Rust opinion stated that prohibiting doctors that receive federal
funds from discussing abortion with their patients was not impermissible
viewpoint discrimination. 97 Instead, it simply reflected government's
choice "to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other."' 98 Yet in Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez,'99 the Court struck down a law restricting
legal aid attorneys' ability to bring suits challenging welfare programs.0 0
The Court ruled that the law was designed to insulate government
programs from Constitutional challenges by excluding "certain vital
theories and ideas" from funding.2 ' Although the programs in Rust and
Legal Services both conditioned the receipt of federal funds on agreeing
to comply with speech-based
restrictions, they resulted in opposite
20 2
outcomes in the Court.
Commentators have noted the difficulty in reconciling the Court's
decisions in these cases. 203 One distinction suggested in Legal Services is
whether the government was acting as a speaker through its funding, or
193. Id. at 837.
194. Id. at 830-35. For a description of public forums, see, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Cr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-93 (1993).

195. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834-35.
196. Id.
197. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (199 1).
198. Id.
199. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).

200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 537.
Id.at 548.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 50, § 11.2.4.4.
See id.
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was attempting to "facilitate private speech. '0 4 For example, in
Rosenberger the Court explained that the University's funding was
intended to encourage private speech by creating a public forum (in
which the government could not engage in viewpoint discrimination),
whereas the program in Rust was intended to convey the government's
objectives. 0 5 Not all justices, however, have agreed with this distinction
between these cases.206 As Justice Scalia commented, if "private doctors'
confidential advice to their patients at issue in Rust constituted
'government speech,' it is hard to imagine what subsidized speech would
not be government speech. 20 7
Another potentially distinguishing factor is the extent to which the
government condition "distort[s]" the "usual functioning" of an "existing
medium of expression. 2 8 In Legal Services, the Court expressed
concern about the impact on the court system of not allowing lawyers to
present potential constitutional issues.20 9 In Rosenberger, the Court was
concerned with the restriction's impact on what the Court had
determined was an open forum.210 In contrast, the Rust Court rejected the
concern that the program infringed upon the physician-patient
relationship.2 1
In sum, U.S. Supreme Court precedent indicates that while a state is
not required to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot
use selective funding.as a means of suppressing dangerous ideas. These
principles are clearly established. However, as Rust and Legal Services
indicate, in practice their application has proven more difficult to
reconcile.

204. 531 U.S. at 542.

205. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995)
(distinguishing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), as a government-based speech program).
206. See Legal Servs., 531 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. Id. (emphasis in original).
208. Id. at 543.
209. Id. at 545-46.

210. See Rosenberger, 531 U.S. at 529-31; cf Legal Servs., 531 U.S. at 543-44 (discussing
Rosenberger).

211. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
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IV. IN DA VEY V. LOCKE, THE NINTH CIRCUIT HELD THAT THE
PROMISE SCHOLARSHIP VIOLATES THE FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE
Although the Ninth Circuit's decision in Davey v. Locke referenced
many other constitutionally-protected rights, the court based its ruling
solely on the violation of the Free Exercise Clause.212 The Ninth Circuit
held that Washington's Promise Scholarship program facially
discriminated against religion, and was not justified by a compelling
state interest. 2 3 As such, the program violated the plaintiffs right to the
free exercise of religion.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Davey reversed a ruling by a federal
district court in the Western District of Washington granting summary
judgment in favor of the state. The district court had rejected Davey's
claims that the state policy violated the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause as well as his rights to the free exercise of religion,
free speech, and equal protection under the state and federal
constitutions. 2 4 Reviewing the free exercise challenges, the district court
concluded that Davey's state claim was substantially the same as that
2
rejected by the Washington State Supreme Court in Witters I11. 15
Because the state constitution prohibited the appropriation of state funds
to subsidize religious training, the court rejected Davey's state law
claim. 2 6 Further, the district court held that the Promise Scholarship's
requirements did not violate the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause, 2 7 noting the distinction between prohibiting an activity and
refusing to fund an activity. 2 8 Finding that Davey "mistakenly presumes
that he has a right to have Washington fund his religious
instruction," the
9
district court denied his Free Exercise Clause claim.

21

A panel on the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision.220
The court began its analysis by acknowledging Church ofLukumi Babalu

212. 299 F.3d 748, 760 (9th Cir. 2002).
213. Id, at 750.
214. Davey v. Locke, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *4-5 (W.D. Wash. 2000), rev'd, 299 F.3d
748 (9th Cir. 2002).

215. Id. at 18.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at *14.
219. Id. at *16.
220. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 760 (9th Cir. 2002).
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" ' The Ninth Circuit viewed
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah as controlling.22
the Hialeah decision as holding that a court must strictly scrutinize any
law lacking facial neutrality towards religion.222 The court stated that the
Promise Scholarship was not neutral under the Hialeahstandard because
both the Promise Scholarship's implementing policy and underlying
state funding of religious education "refer on
statutory prohibition on
223

their face to religion.,

The Ninth Circuit then determined that the state's policy of
prohibiting funding for religious majors imposed an unconstitutional
disability based on religious status. 224 The court relied on McDaniel v.
Paty2 25 for the proposition that a law cannot offer a general benefit to all,

but then deny that benefit to a select group based solely on religion.226
Comparing the state law at issue in McDaniel, which prohibited clergy
from serving in the legislature, to the funding restriction in Davey, the
Ninth Circuit stated that "[a] minister could not be both a minister and a
delegate in Tennessee any more than Davey can be both a student
pursuing a degree in theology and a Promise Scholar in Washington. "227
The Davey majority also rejected the state's argument that the Promise
Scholarship was consistent with other conditional funding programs
approved by the U.S. Supreme Court.228 The Ninth Circuit distinguished
the Promise Scholarship from these cases by relying on the Rosenberger
decision, which focused on the First Amendment right to free expression
in a public forum. 229 The Ninth Circuit took from Rosenberger the
premise that a "restriction based on religion is aimed at 'suppression of
dangerous ideas,"' and as such was impermissible. Moving from the
free speech realm of the Rosenberger case to the free exercise issue in
Davey,23' the Ninth Circuit held that the Washington program was an

221. Id. at 753.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 754.

225. 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (plurality opinion).
226. Davey, 299 F.3d at 754.
227. Id. (emphasis in original).
228. Id. at 754-55.
229. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995).
230. Davey, 299 F.3d. at 755.
231. See id. at 764 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (describing the majority's "reach[] across the First
Amendment divide").
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attempt to "suppress a particular point of view, ' 32 making the program
"presumptively unconstitutional. 233
Having determined that the Promise Scholarship program fell under
the Hialeah standard and thereby required strict scrutiny, the court held
that the state lacked a compelling interest in the discrimination. 23 4 The
court recognized that Washington's interest in complying with its own
constitution was "indisputably strong., 235 However, the
Ninth Circuit
236
ruled that the Free Exercise Clause trumped this interest.
The Davey dissent, on the other hand, disagreed with the majority's
analysis of both the Free Exercise Clause 237 and conditional funding
cases. 238 The dissent first asserted that U.S. Supreme Court precedent in
Free Exercise Clause challenges was inconclusive on the issue at hand.239
Second, the dissent noted that the majority's decision was inconsistent
with the Court's analysis in other fundamental rights cases, and
explained that the Promise Scholarship's rules simply reflected a
permissible conditioning on the use of state funds.24 °
As a result of Davey, a state supporting higher education through
scholarships cannot exclude theology degrees without violating the Free
Exercise Clause.24' It is irrelevant whether the object of the law is to
promote a separation of church and state or simply to suppress religion.
As the dissent noted, this decision curtails a state's ability to define its
own understanding of religious liberty.242
V.

WASHINGTON'S PROMISE SCHOLARSHIP DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

In holding that Washington's Promise Scholarship violated the free
exercise of religion, the Davey court misapplied Ninth Circuit and U.S.
Supreme Court precedent. First, the court ignored Ninth Circuit
232. Id. at 755 (quoting Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 830).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 758-60.
235. Id. at 759.
236. Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)).
237. Id. at 761-64 (McKeown, J.,
dissenting).
238. See id. at 761 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (concluding that "the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence in the abortion funding cases guides our decision here").
239. Id. at 761-64 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 764-68 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
24 1. See id. at 760.
242. See id. at 760-61, 768 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
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precedent by applying strict scrutiny analysis without determining if the
law reflected an attempt to suppress religion.243 Had the court followed
KDM and performed its analysis, the Davey court would have concluded
that the Promise Scholarship did not have an object of suppressing
religion, and was therefore not subject to strict scrutiny.244 Second, the
Ninth Circuit failed to adequately distinguish the Promise Scholarship
from permissible funding programs. As the dissent in Davey correctly
explained, the state's refusal to pay for religious training does not
prohibit the exercise of religion any more than the state's refusal to pay
for an abortion prohibits the exercise of a fundamental right.2 45 As a
result, the court's decision contradicts U.S. Supreme Court precedent
involving the funding of constitutionally-protected rights.
A.

Washington's Promise ScholarshipDoes Not Impermissibly
DiscriminateAgainst Religion

Washington's refusal to fund a religious degree does not violate the
Free Exercise Clause. Based on Ninth Circuit precedent, Hialeah's strict
scrutiny review is only required if the object of the law is to suppress
religion.246 Because the Promise Scholarship does not have a purpose of
targeting religion, the Hialeah test is inapposite. 247 Further, the Davey
court erred in relying on McDaniel because the Promise Scholarship does
not discriminate based on religious status.248
1.

The Ninth CircuitIgnored its Own Precedentby Applying Hialeah's
Strict Scrutiny Analysis in Davey

Prior to subjecting the Promise Scholarship to strict scrutiny review,
the Ninth Circuit should have first determined if the program's policies
had an object of suppressing religion.249 Only three years prior to Davey,
the Ninth Circuit in KDM did not apply strict scrutiny to a law lacking
facial neutrality because the law as applied did not reflect an object or

243. See KDM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 1999).
244. See 96 F.3d 1046, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 1999).
245. See 299 F.3d at 761, 764-68 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
246. See KDM, 196 F.3d at 1050-51.
247. See id.; accordStroutv. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 65 (1st Cir. 1999).
248. See Davey, 299 F.3d at 753.
249. See supra notes 137-142 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit's approach in
KDM to determining if a law lacking facial neutrality required strict scrutiny review).
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purpose of suppressing religion. 25' The court cited this lack of purposeful
hostility as a distinguishing factor from Hialeah.2 5' Yet the Davey court
failed to address the court's reasoning in KDM 2 52 Although the laws at
issue in Davey and KDM were different,253 the free exercise question was
substantially the same: must a law that is not facially neutral towards
religion be justified by a compelling state interest? The KDM court
answered this question in the negative, instead first reviewing if the
government action burdened the plaintiff and had as an object the
suppression of religion.254 The Davey court, however, ignored this
precedent and concluded that the Hialeah decision controlled because the
Promise Scholarship's policies "refer on their face to religion." '55
Although both the KDM and Davey courts can draw some support
from the Hialeah opinion, 56 the KDM approach is more consistent with
Supreme Court jurisprudence. As indicated by the Hialeah decision, the
Court's concern was preventing laws "designed to persecute or oppress a
religion or its practices.' ' 257 The Court even couched its discussion of
facial neutrality in terms of deciphering if the object of a law was the
suppression of religion.258 Summarizing why the ordinances at issue in
Hialeah failed the neutrality requirement, the Court came to "one
conclusion: The ordinances had as their object the suppression of
religion." '59

250. KDM, 196 F.3d at 1051.
251. Id. (citing Strout, 178 F.3d 57).
252. The majority opinion in Davey only refers to KDM once, and does not discuss how its
analysis of the Hialeah decision is distinguishable. See Davey 299 F.3d at 759.
253. The Oregon statute did not require choosing between the pursuit of a religious practice and
state funding-it only affected the manner of receiving those benefits. See KDM, 196 F.3d at 105051.
254. Id.
255. 299 F.3d at 753.
256. For example, the Hialeah opinion states both that "the minimum requirement of neutrality is
that a law not discriminate on its face," 508 U.S. at 533, and that "if the object of a law is to infringe
upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral." Id.
257. Id. at 547; see also id. at 533, 542.
258. See id. at 533 (commenting that "the minimum requirement" of facial neutrality is one of
"many ways" of determining the object of a law).
259. Id. at 542. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Stevens, also pointed to Equal Protection cases
for guidance in the neutrality inquiry. 508 U.S. at 540-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Court's
Equal Protection decisions support the view that the Court's concern is with preventing animus
towards particular groups. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973).
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The Davey court's emphasis on whether laws "refer on their face to
religion '260 is also at odds with the Supreme Court's approach in Smith.
The Court noted in Smith that amending neutral laws in order to create

"nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption[s]," such as allowing

peyote use in religious ceremonies, may be permissible.26' Under the
Davey court's approach, 62 however, these exemptions would qualify as

non-neutral, and would be subject to strict scrutiny review.
Had the Davey court followed the reasoning of KDM, it would have
concluded that the Promise Scholarship did not require strict scrutiny

review.263 Contrasting the facts of the Davey and Hialeahcases, it is clear
that the Promise Scholarship's requirements are not designed to suppress
religion. Unlike the city ordinances at issue in Hialeah, the object of
Washington's policy does not indicate "substantial animus" against any
practice of religion.264 In Hialeah, the Supreme Court emphasized that
the city had specifically created ordinances in order to suppress certain
religious practices. 265 The Promise Scholarship has no similar purpose. In
fact, the Ninth Circuit in Davey even recognized that the purpose of the
Washington law was to respect the separation between church and
state.266

A government's desire to ensure the separation of church and state
does not indicate an attempt to suppress religion. 267 As Justice Brennan
explained, courts should not "underestimate[] the role of the
Establishment Clause as a coguarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of
religious liberty. The Framers did not entrust the liberty of religious

260. Davey, 299 F.3d at 753.
261. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
262. See 299 F.3d at 753.
263. See KDM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Hialeah,
508 U.S. at 534, 542 (looking beyond an ordinances' facial neutrality to determine the object of the
laws).
264. See Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 65 (1st Cir. 1999); See also Davey, 299 F.3d at 762
(McKeown, J., dissenting) (concluding there should be "no such suspicion of animosity in this
case").
265. 508 U.S. at 542. In addition, the ordinances at issue in Hialeah also showed their
discriminatory intent by carving out exceptions to certain religions, but not all. See id. at 535-36.
266. 299 F.3d at 758-59 (acknowledging Washington's "indisputably strong interest" in not
violating the state's constitutional separation of church and state); see also id. at 761 (McKeown, J.,
dissenting) ("In the State of Washington's case, it has assiduously avoided violating the first tenet of
the Religion Clauses, and in doing so has not overstepped the bounds of the latter.").
267. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 217-22 (1963) (summarizing
cases).
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beliefs to either clause alone." '68 Neither did the Framers of the
Washington Constitution. 269 Article I, Section 11 of the Washington
Constitution, which contains the prohibition on state funding of religion,
is entitled "Religious Freedom." It begins: "[a]bsolute freedom of
conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship, shall
be guaranteed to every individual.,

270

This is not the language of hostility

religion.27'

towards
In deciding not to fund religious training,
Washington is not attempting to suppress religion, but to respect the
separation of church and state.
2.

The Ninth Circuit Incorrectly Analogized the Promise Scholarship
in Davey to the Statute in McDaniel

The majority's reliance on the McDaniel Court's religious status
doctrine is also misplaced. The majority reasoned that the Promise
Scholarship discriminated based on religious status in a manner similar
to the Tennessee law in McDaniel that prohibited clergy from holding
public office because of their religious status.7 2 Yet the two cases are
dissimilar. In McDaniel, Tennessee penalized the plaintiff-took away a
right to hold public office-because of his status as a minister. 73 In
contrast, the plaintiff in Davey demanded that the state pay for an activity

268. Id. at 256 (Brennan, J., concurring).
269. See, e.g., Witters Ill, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 386-89, 771 P.2d 1119, 1130-32 (1989) (Utter, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the history of the state's constitutional provision).
270. WASH. CONST. art. 1,§ II (as amended 1993).
271. Commentators have suggested that, at the time of their passage in the late 1800's and early
1900's, similar provisions in state constitutions were based on hostility towards Catholic schools.
See, e.g., JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND

CIVIL SOCIETY 151-68 (1999). But cf Noah Feldman, Non-sectarianismReconsidered, 18 J. L. &
Politics 65, 112 (2002) (acknowledging that "opposition to state funding of Catholic schools" played
a role in the creation of these state provisions, but arguing that "non-sectarianism was broadly
understood as a plausible and correct solution to the problem of moral education and religious
heterogeneity"). Other commentators have concluded that the passage of Washington's
establishment clause, while repudiating "government-backed sectarianism," also reflected a "lack of
hostility toward religion generally." Robert F. Utter & Edward J.Larson, Church and State on the
Frontier: the History of the Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 451, 472 (1988). Of note, Washington's statutory prohibition on state
funding for theology students was enacted in 1969, see 1969 WASH. LAWS EX. SESS. 222 § 15, long
removed from the time period of "religious tensions that plagued the United States during the latter
third of the nineteenth century." See Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions,
86 VA. L. REV. 117, 140 (2000).

272. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 2002).
273. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 620, 626-27 (1978).
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it had chosen not to subsidize-regardless of religious status.274 The
plaintiff in Davey was not being penalized for pursuing a religious
degree any more than the plaintiff in Harrisv. McRae was penalized by
Medicaid's refusal to pay for an abortion.275 As the Supreme Court stated
in Harris, the funding decision simply represents "a refusal to subsidize
certain protected conduct. 276
The Court's rationale in Harris indicates why the Promise Scholarship
must be reconciled with the Court's review of other funding programs.
As explained below, the Court has distinguished between those programs
that penalize the exercise of a constitutionally protected right, and those
programs that simply refuse to fund the exercise of one's constitutionally
protected right.277 The former is impermissible, the latter is not.278 Davey
falls into the latter permissible category.
B.

The Ninth CircuitFailedto Adequately Distinguish the Promise
Scholarship's Requirementsfrom PermissibleGovernment Funding
Programs

Comparing the Promise Scholarship to similar programs involving the
conditional funding of protected activities demonstrates that the Promise
Scholarship's requirements are permissible.2 79 As the dissent in Davey
asserted, the requirements placed on the Promise Scholarship by
Washington are similar to those approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in
other conditional funding cases.28 ° Although the Ninth Circuit attempted
to distinguish the Promise Scholarship based on Rosenberger, analysis of
that case demonstrates that the cases are dissimilar.

274. See Davey, 299 F.3d at 751.
275. Compare Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980) (reviewing the constitutionality of
"denying public funding for certain medically necessary abortions"), with Davey, 299 F.3d at 749
(reviewing the constitutionality of denying public funding of theology degrees). See also Davey, 299
dissenting) (noting the "indistinguishable similarity between this case
F.3d at 764-65 (McKeown, J.,
and those that address the abortion funding cases").
276. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317.
277. See infra Part V.B.
278. See infra Part V.B.
279. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201-03 (1991).
dissenting).
280. Davey, 299 F. 3d at 761, 764-68 (McKeown, J.,
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1. The Promise Scholarship'sRequirements are Analogous to Other
PermissibleLimitations Placedon Government Funding Programs
As illustrated by similar funding programs upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Promise Scholarship's requirements are permissible.
On a funding basis, the government action at issue in Davey is similar to
" ' In
the law in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington.28
both cases, the plaintiff claimed that the government's decision to
selectively fund certain activities violated their First Amendment rights
and the Equal Protection Clause.282 In Regan, the First Amendment right
was to free speech; 83 in Davey the court focused on the right to the free
exercise of religion. 84 Both claimed that once the state decided to
generally subsidize an activity (lobbying in Regan; education
scholarships in Davey), the state could not then selectively decline to
fund other activities.285 The Regan Court rejected this view, stating that
"although government may not place obstacles in the path of a [person's
exercise of a liberty], it need not remove those not of its own creation. "286
The same logic applies to the scholarship program at issue in Davey.
Washington cannot prohibit students from studying theology, but it can
decide not to fund those studies.
As noted above, the Court's decision in Harris also supports this
conclusion.2 87 The Promise Scholarship excepted religious degrees from
an otherwise general funding program; the law at issue in Harris
similarly excepted specific procedures, involving constitutionally
protected rights, while funding other procedures in general. 288 The Court
in Harris determined that this policy was permissible, stating that the
program's condition left a woman with "at least the same range of
choice" regarding an abortion as she would have had if Congress did not
289
subsidize health care at all.

281. Compare Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 542 (1983)
(reviewing statute providing tax exemptions to certain nonprofit groups), with Davey, 299 F.3d at

750 (reviewing statute and policy providing scholarship to certain students); see also Appellees'
Brief at 18-20, Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-35962).
282. Compare Regan, 461 U.S. at 542, with Davey, 299 F.3d at 750.
283. 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983).
284. 299 F.3d at 760.
285. Compare Regan, 461 U.S. at 545, with Davey, 299 F.3d at 753.

286. 461 U.S. at 549 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)).
287. See supra Part V.A.2.
288. See 448 U.S. at 301-02.

289. Id. at 317.
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The law at issue in Davey is indistinguishable. The state opted in
general to subsidize students that met the requirements of the Promise
Scholarship, but not the pursuit of a theology degree.290 The Promise
Scholarship's requirements leave students "with at least the same range
of choice"29' in deciding upon a major as they would have had if the
legislature had decided not to have the scholarship in the first place. 92
Justice White's concurring opinion in Harris also supports this
assertion. According to Justice White, the government's refusal to fund
abortion procedures was not intended "to interfere with or to impose any
coercive restraint" on a woman's liberty.293 Because there was no
coercive restraint, the state's acknowledged "legitimate interest in a
potential life" was enough to rationally justify the conditional funding.294
This same reasoning applies equally to the Promise Scholarship. The
majority in Davey acknowledged that the state has an "indisputably
strong interest in not appropriating or applying money to religious
instruction as mandated by its constitution., 295 Far from seeking "to
interfere with or impose any coercive restraint" 296 on Davey's pursuit of
a theology degree, the state attempted to comply with its own
constitution by not getting entangled in religious training.2 97
The Davey case is distinguishable from the Legal Services case as
well. In striking down the restriction on federally-subsidized attorneys
challenging the constitutionality of welfare programs, the Court in Legal
Services emphasized the concern over manipulating the proper
functioning of the courts.2 9 8 Attorneys could not raise potential issues to

the court, suggesting a separation of powers issue by requiring judges to
rule on the constitutionality of programs without the benefit of hearing
all possible arguments. 299 The Promise Scholarship raises no such
separation of powers concerns. Rather, it is more analogous to the
government restrictions on the advice family planning doctors receiving

290. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020 (2001).
291. See Harris,448 U.S. at 317.
292. Cf Davey, 299 F.3d at 768 (McKeown, J., dissenting) ("Davey is just as reliant on private
sources of aid for his education as he was before he applied for the scholarship funds.").
293. Harris,448 U.S. at 328 (White, J., concurring).
294. 1d.
295. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 759 (9th Cir. 2002).
296. Harris,448 U.S. at 328 (White, J., concurring).
297. See Davey, 299 F.3d. at 761 (McKeown, J, dissenting).
298. 531 U.S. 533, 546 (2001).
299. Id.
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federal funding could give to their patients in Rust v. Sullivan, which the
Court upheld.3 °° In so holding, the Court noted that participants could
reasonably be expected to know the conditional nature of the program.30 '
According to the Court, the program's restrictions did not compromise
the physician-patient relationship because the participants should have
known the bounds of the program and that they were free to go outside of
the program to get abortion-related services.30 2 In a similar manner,
students receiving the Promise Scholarship were free to pursue a
theology degree,30 3 just not as a Promise Scholar. Thus, Washington's
Promise Scholarship fell within the bounds of permissible funding
programs under Supreme Court precedent.
2.

Washington's Refusal to Fund a Religious Degree Does Not
Suppress DangerousIdeas

The majority in Davey also mistakenly concluded that a restriction on
the funding of a religious degree is aimed "at the suppression of
dangerous ideas. 30 4 The court's reliance on the Rosenberger decision
fails because the Davey case did not involve a state-created public forum
in which the state attempted to regulate speech based on viewpoint.3 5 As
a recipient of the Promise Scholarship, Davey could speak as freely on
religious matters as he could if he were not a recipient.30 6 This was not
the case in Rosenberger, where the school conditioned funds on agreeing
to not use the money for religious speech within the public forum.30 7 As
noted, the Promise Scholarship allows recipients to use state funds to

300. See 500 U.S. 173, 178 (1991).
301. See id. at 200 (noting the program does not "justify an expectation on the part of the patient
of comprehensive medical advice").
302. Id.at 196-200; accord Legal Servs., 531 U.S. at 546.
303. Washington law prohibited the state from providing scholarships to students pursuing
theology degrees; it did not prohibit students from pursuing theology degrees. See WASH. REV.
CODE § 28B.10.814 (2002).
304. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2002).
305. See Davey, 299 F.3d at 766-68 (McKeown, J.,
dissenting); accord Davey v. Locke, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS, 22273, at *21 (W.D. Wash. 2000), rev'd, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002).
306. In addition, to distinguish the Rosenberger and Regan cases, the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Rosenberger, noted that the Regan decision was based on the "preferential treatment" of certain
groups (veterans), and not the content of the speech as in Rosenberger. 515 U.S. at 834. Similarly,
the Promise Scholarship's requirements are based on group status, not the content of that group's
speech. See WASH ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12)() (2001); WASH REV. CODE § 28B1.0.814
(2002).
307. See 515 U.S. at 825.
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enroll in religion classes and to attend religiously affiliated schools; it
simply declines to fund an education culminating in a theology degree.
As such, it doesn't attempt to close or limit access to a public forum
based on viewpoint."'
Further, if the Davey court was correct and the Promise Scholarship's
conditions are aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas, then so are
all "no aid" conditions supported by a half century of Establishment
Clause decisions. 0 9 Over that time, the U.S Supreme Court has
consistently approved of government funding programs that required
secular or religiously-neutral use of state funds, while frequently striking
down programs without these restrictions."' Under the Ninth Circuit's
rationale in Davey, a program could not subsidize the construction of
academic facilities generally but "expressly prohibit[] use of the facilities
for religious purposes."3 1 Yet in Tilton, a similar type of program
survived an Establishment Clause challenge specifically because it had
this requirement.3"2 In fact, the Court struck down the portion of this law
that allowed religious schools to use these buildings for religious
purposes after twenty years as a violation of the Establishment Clause.3 13
308. In non-public forum cases, a funding restriction is permissible unless it threatens "to drive
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace." See Nat'l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569, 587 (1998) (internal citations omitted); see also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S 533,
552 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Considering that Promise Scholars are free to express religious opinions
and views openly, it is doubtful that Davey could meet this requirement. See Davey, 299 F.3d at
766-68 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
309. See supra part l.B.I (discussing Supreme Court precedent involving "no aid" to religion
provisions).
310. See supra part I.B.
I. In Mitchell v.Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), Justice Thomas' plurality
opinion commented that "nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the exclusion of pervasively
sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid programs, and other doctrines of this Court bar it."
Id. at 840. Yet a majority of the Court has never aecepted this view. Cf id. at 840 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment) (stating she "disagree[d] with the plurality's conclusion that actual
diversion of government aid to religious indoctrination is consistent with the Establishment
Clause").
311. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (plurality opinion); accord Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 759 (1973); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 759 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (stating that "institutions are not so permeated by religion that the secular side
cannot be separated from the sectarian") (citation omitted).
312. See 403 U.S. at 679-80; cf Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 211-12, 235 (1997) (allowing
public teachers to provide remedial instruction at religious schools, noting that "safeguards" ensured
that no religious aid was provided through the program).
313. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 683. All justices agreed with the plurality that allowing religious use
the facilities after twenty years violated the Establishment Clause. See id. at 692 (Douglas,
dissenting in part); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 660-61 (1970) (Brennan, J.,concurring
part with Lemon and concurring and dissenting in part with Tilton); id at 665 n.l (White,
concurring and dissenting in part with Lemon and concurring in judgment with Tilton).

of
J.,
in
J.,
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Although the Ninth Circuit borrowed from other areas of First
Amendment jurisprudence in its Davey opinion,3 14 it did not address this
Establishment Clause precedent. Instead, the Davey court relied heavily
on the Rosenberger Court's analysis of the Establishment Clause in
public forum cases.315 But as Justice O'Connor stated in a concurring
opinion in Rosenberger, that decision did not "signal[] the demise of the
funding prohibition in Establishment Clause jurisprudence."3 ' Had the
Ninth Circuit looked at the Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it would
have concluded that the Promise Scholarship does not impermissibly
suppress "dangerous ideas. 31 7
C.

Absent a "FreeExercise Problem," Strict Scrutiny is Not Required

Assuming that there is no free exercise problem with the conditions of
the Promise Scholarship, Washington did not need to establish a
compelling government interest.3 8 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged in
Davey that "[t]he cases upon which [the state] relies.., indicate that
states may rely on their own (or the federal) establishment clause if there
is no free exercise problem. 3,1 9 The Davey majority justified not
following these cases because it found that a free exercise "problem"
existed. Thus, it follows that if the Promise Scholarship's requirements
did not indicate a free exercise "problem, ' 32 0 then the Ninth Circuit
should not have used strict scrutiny analysis. Instead, the court should
314. See supra notes 228-233 and accompanying text.
315. Davey, 299 F.3d. at 755-56.
316. 515 U.S. 819, 852 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
317. See supra Part I.BI.
318. See, e.g., KDM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 1999). Strict
scrutiny would not be required under the Hernandez test because Davey could not prove a
"substantial burden on the observation of a central belief or practice." See Strout v. Albanese, 178
F.3d 57, 65 (lst Cir. 1999) (citing Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)) (emphasis in
original). As discussed in the conditional funding cases, see supra Part V.B.I, the fact that
Washington refuses to fund the pursuit of a religious degree does not place Davey in a worse
position than he would have otherwise been. See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 768 (9th Cir. 2002)
(McKeown, J., dissenting); cf Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980) (concluding that
Congress's refusal to pay for a medically necessary abortion "leaves an indigent woman with at least
the same range of choice ... as she would have had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health
care costs at all"). In addition, as the dissent in Davey makes clear, Davey has not factually shown
that the restriction substantially burdened his exercise of religion. 299 F.3d at 764 (McKeown, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, Davey continued to pursue his studies, "finding available after-school work to
make up the difference" of the scholarship. Id. (McKeown, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
319. Davey, 299 F.3d at 759 (emphasis in original).
320. See supra Parts V.A. I-V.A.2.
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only have applied rational basis review to determine the Promise
Scholarship's constitutionality.3 2'
Under a rational basis review, Washington's funding decision is
justified. The decision is rationally related to legitimate government
interests, including ensuring the degree of church and state separation
required under the Washington constitution.
Although the Ninth
Circuit held that Washington's interest in not violating its own
constitution could not survive strict scrutiny,2 3 the court nevertheless
acknowledged that this interest was "indisputably strong. ' '324
Consequently, Washington has a legitimate interest in not violating its
own constitution and satisfies rational basis review. The Ninth Circuit
came to a similar conclusion in KDM."' Addressing the petitioner's
Equal Protection Clause claim in KDM, the Ninth Circuit held that the
state's interest in not violating its own state constitution was a legitimate
government interest. 3 6 If strict scrutiny is not required of this law and the
Promise Scholarship is subject to rational basis review, then it follows
that Washington's Promise Scholarship is constitutional.3 7
VI. CONCLUSION
Davey has the right to pursue a theology degree, but Washington has
no duty to subsidize it. Washington believes that using state funds to
subsidize religious training erodes the religious liberty that its state
constitution attempts to protect. Because the object of the Promise
Scholarship is to support higher education within the confines of the state
321. SeeKDM, 196 F.3d at 1050-51.
322. See Davey, 299 F.3d at 759.

323. Id. at 759-60.
324. Id. at 759.
325. 196 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
326. Id.

327. The Promise Scholarship might also be able to survive strict scrutiny analysis, if required.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Widmar v. Vincent did not rule out the possibility that a state's attempt to

comply with the mandates of its own constitution could ever rise to the level of a "compelling
interest" justifying an infringement on the Free Exercise Clause. See 454 U.S. 263, 275 (1981). If it
is possible, the Promise Scholarship would be a good candidate. First, the state's long history of

ensuring religious liberty through the separation of church and state can be regarded as government
action "protecting an interest of the highest order," as required by Hialeah. See Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (internal citations omitted). Second, the

Promise Scholarship's rules are narrowly tailored to conform with the state's Constitution without
being overly broad, as evidenced by the fact that students can use the scholarship at religiously

affiliated schools. The Court's federalism jurisprudence and emphasis on state's rights might also
support this conclusion. See Davey, 299 F.3d at 768 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
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constitution and not to suppress religion, it should not be subject to strict
scrutiny. The Promise Scholarship's conditions represent a rational
choice by the state legislature to comply with the state constitution.
Compared to other conditional funding programs approved by the
Supreme Court, Washington's Promise Scholarship is constitutional.
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